




AN INQUIRY INTO THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL













Faculty cf the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
r.a^tt.v of Arts
Intemat i o na 1 Relations
Signature of Committee;
Chairman
Dean of the School
19<
The Americ





Located in the Department cf Defense is the Office cf the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). It
is often described as the "Pentagon's State Departi snt".
ISA had its beginnings in 19/+9 as the inter-departmental point
of contact within the Department of Defense on matters of military assis-
tance. From this form of a simple military assistance institution it has
evolved into a politico-military bureau. This has occurred primarily
because the role of the Defense Establishment in the area of intern:
tional security affairs has grown with the realization that defense
policies involve not merely matters of strategy but also involve rela-
tions with allies and international organizations, and are influenced by
the availability of resources. All of these require close coordi:
with the Deportment of State and other agencies of government. This is
the basic concern of the Office of ISA, which today has administration
responsibility for military aid and sales, for liaison with the Depart-
ment of State, for following up National Security Council decisions., and
for arranging Defense participation in international conferences.
Of all the units under the Secretary of Defense, the Office of
ISA is the one most directly related to the overall organization for
notional security. As the focal point for Department of Defense positions
on national security matters it has been articulate and, as a result, has
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Located in the Department of Defense is the Offica of the Assi
ant Secretary of Defense for- International Security Affairs (ISA). It
is often described as the "Pentagon's State Department".
ISA had its beginnings in 19-49 as the inter-departmental point
of contact within the Department of Defense on natters of foreign mili-
tary assistance. In 1949 inter-departmental contacts and coordination,
although not a new concept in government, were still rare and did not
have a long history, especially as they related to the Departments of
State and Defense. In fact, the very first institutionalized link
between the civilian and the military policy making pewers did not occur
until 193&> °nd was brought about as a result of Fascist and National
Socialist activities in Latin America. A Standing Liaison Committee
composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff of the Army,
and the Chief of Naval Operations was established by President Roosevelt
in April of that year to coordinate certain types of assistance Tor the
defense of the Panama Canal and the protection of Latin America against
the Axis thraat. Although some coordination did exist during Viorld '»ar
II, it was neither close nor significant ai I .. s completely inadequate
Urs Schv/arz , American Strategy: A New Pers pective
,
(New York:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 25-26. *

2for dealing with the complex involvements which obtained in the post
World War II period. But, it was not until the passage of the National
Security Act of 194-7 that legislation provided for the establishment of
integrated policies and procedures for the departments,' agencies, and
2functions of the Government relating to the national security.
In July 1959, the U. S. Senate established the Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations to
study how well our Government was organized to develop, coordin; bi
,
and
execute foreign and defense policy. It was the finding of this Subcom-
mittee that the most important problems of national security are joint
State -be fe use problems, requiring joint action by the two departments for
3their solution. These problems range from the development and execution
of military aid programs, the negotiation of base rights, and arms control
planning, through the overriding problems of properly relating military
means with foreign policy ends.
The Senate Subcommittee also recognized that cooperation between
State and Defense had not always been close primarily because Defense
lac!~d confidence in State's handling of military matters and felf it
could not get precise enough long term political guidance. State, on
2
National Security Act of 1947, As Amended , Sec . 2, Public Law
.216., 81st Congress, August 10, 1949.
3
U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery,
Q ' ;anizing For National Security : Staff Rej r_t and ] tions,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Volume 3> P« 49.

the other hand, deplored the Pentagon's inability to speak with one voice
on strategic doctrine.
^
Despite the deep-seated differences of tradition and outlook, which
had stood between the Pentagon and the State Department, a full and sym-
pathetic partnership between State and Defense v/as, in the view of the
Subcommittee, critical to achieving our national security goals.
5
Thus, from a simple military assistance institution establish
for the purpose of coordination, ISA has evolved into a politico -mi.l it'
bureau. In addition to fulfilling a need for coordination, this gro\
has occurred primarily because the role of the Defense Establishment in
the area of international security affairs has groTfn with the realiza-
tion that defense policies involve not merely matters of st-rate gy but
also involve relations with allies ana international organisations, and
are influenced by the availability of resources. These are the basic
concerns of the Office of ISA, which today has administrative responsi-
bility for military aid and military sales, for liaison with the Depart-
ment of State, for following up National Security Council decisions, and
for arranging Defense participation in international conference^.
The Charter for ISA designates the Assistant Secretary of Defense




functional field of international security. As such he is author!
.
to coordinate not only with State, but with the Military departments,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Department of Defense agencies
having collateral or related functions in this field, and to make full
use of the established facilities within the Defense Establishment.
This authorization to maintain close relationships with other
agencies allows ISA, in search of answers and solutions to current prob-
lems, to be both responsive and prompt in furnishing the Secretary of
Defense with the necessary information and analysis to support him in
his capacity as a statuatory member of the National Security Council.
Of all the units under the Secretary of Defense, the Office of
ISA is the one most directly related to the overall organization for
national security. As the focal point for Department of Defense posi-
tions on national security matters it has teen dynamic and articulate,
and, as a result, has exerted considerable and positive influence in
the formulation of national security policy.
This inquiry will focus on the origins and evolution of ISA, and
will examine in some detail the ccmelex and 'vcri^d undertakings which
involve this Office in the Defense Department's policy making process.
In pursuing this inquiry the candidate has relied mainly on
existing and superseded Department of Defense documents and interviews
over a three year period with personnel who have worked or who are now
working in the Office of International Security '"s.

CHAPTER II
ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 07 ISA
I. 1947-19A9
Before the Korean War the Office of the Secretary of Defense v
relatively small. In addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Muni-
tions Board, and the Research and Development Board, there was only the
War Council, now called the Armed Forces Policy Council. Even the staff
of the Secretary of Defense was small and included only three special
assistants who were primarily engaged with fiscal, budget, and milits
aid matters and who worked with the Armed Services in coordinating the
Defense Department's responsibilities in these fields. During this
period, the War Council advised the Secretary of Defense on both civilian
and military matters. In 1949 it was made the majcr intra-departraental
body to consider problems before they were submitted to the National
Security Council (NSC). But the War Council proved ineffective as a
policy formulating instrument for politico-military affairs, partly
because it overlapped the role assigned by the National Security Act
of 1947 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisors
to the President and the National Security Council. In addition, the
then existing State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC),
6
It was redesigned by the National Security Act Amend F 19^9
and combined the memberships of the Joint Secretaries (minus the Assis-
tant Secretary of 1 nse for International Security Affairs) with that
of the JCS.

6which was in effect a clearing house for information, tended to short
circuit the War Council's work. This Committee was finally abolished
in late 1949.
II. 1949-1952
After the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,
the Secretary of Defense established an Office of Military Assistance
(OIvIa) to work with State and the Economic Cooperation Administration in
administering the military aid program, and the Chief of Staff Army was
designated by the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for Mutual
7Defense Assistance. As such it fell to the Army to coordinate the
interests and activities of the throe military departments.
The Korean War and the defense build-up which followed brought
about a broad expansion of the international security affairs' area.
U. S. military aid was substantially increased, NATO was strengthened,
plans were made to rearm Germany, and a Japanese peace treaty was signed,
But the embryo International Security Affairs organization, which then
consisted of the Armed Forces Policy Council and the Office of T "ilitary
Assistance (OMA) still proved inadequate in handling all of the politico-
military problems that arose. Some, such as the strategy re-evaluation
contained in one of the basic National Security Council policy papers,
7
Timothy \i . Stanley,
,
san Defense and National Security
,
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 46.

7and the instructions to the United States' delegate at the Panmumjora
armistice negotiations, were apparantly handled by special ad hoc
groups composed of State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff representa-
tives. On others, a representative of International. Security Affairs was
included, as with the proposal to rearm Germany. According to one parti-
cipant in the State-JCS-ISA conference on the subject, the National
Security Council never formally discussed this decision, although it
was cleared with each member individually.
On December 19, 1950, President Truman established the position
of Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs. The responsibility of this office and the staff
associated with it were steadily increased so that by 1952, these
responsibilities included the development of Department of Defense vi
and positions and the coordination of all activities within the Depart-
ment of Defense relating to international security affairs, including
mutual defense assistance programs, North Atlantic Treaty affairs,
United Nations affairs, National Security Council actions, psychologi-
cal po? icy affcirs, inter-governmcntal conferences and other politico-
military matters, and for arranging for the representation of the
Department of Defense on inter-agency and international organizations
related to international security affairs. To meet these responsibili-




8for International Security Affairs was organized to provide for four
Deputy Assistants; one to act as : Deputy Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense; and one each for National Security Council affairs, Euro-
pean Mutual Security affairs, and Psychological affairs. In addition,
offices for Military Assistance, Foreign Military affairs, North Atlantic
Treaty affairs, and Foreign Economic Defense affairs were established.
(See Figure- 1, page 9.)
Under the guidance of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to
the Secretary was able to speak authoritatively for the i • 'ti . :.'. on
International Security Affairs in dealing with other government agencies.
The Deputies and other offices were assigned the following duties:
Deputy for N ational Security Council Affairs-—served as a Deputy
Representative to the Senior Staff of the National Security Council (NSC).
Deputy for Europe an Mutua l Se curity Affairs—served as the focal
point for and coordinated matters transacted between the Department of
Defense and the U. S. Special Representative in Europe.
Deputy for Psychological Policy Affairs—advised on matte rs
relating to the Psychological Stral igy Board in furtherance of the
national psychological effort, and advised on broad in' :nce matters
other than those relating to domestic security for which the Sec:
of Defense had policy responsibility as a member of the National
Security Council.
Office of fc ' Lstance _ sponsible for insuring the
dev lc nt ana implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance
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pursuant to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 194-9, th tual Secur-
ity Act of 1951 and for coordinating matters affecting the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization with the Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs.
This Office acted as the point of contact and coordination for all
matters concerning the military end item and training programs for mili-
tary assistance and as the focal point for the Secretary of Defense in
dealing in those matters with the U. S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe,
other government agencies, the JCS, Munitions Board, the three services
and the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG). General Lyman L.
Lemnitzer, USA, now Supreme Allied Commander in Europe was appointed
the first director of this office.
Office of Foreign Military Affairs—this office was charged with
developing and establishing Department of Defense policies and programs
in the politico-military field and similar to the Office cf Military
Assistance, was also responsible for coordinating matters affecting
the NATO with the Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs. This office
also maintained a world wide analysis and review of the politico-military
situation and recommended courses of action to the Secretary of Defense,
through the Special Assistant Secretary/ISA, required to correct current
and anticipated problems. It was this office that coordinated the
Department of Defense position on all matters in the politico-milit; r;
field and became the focal point of the Department of Defense dealings
in these matters with the Department of State 'and other agencies exter-
nal to Defense. Politico-mi3.iti.iry aspects of U. S. military buses on
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foreign territory and juridicial status of U. S. forces abroad also fell
under the cognizance of this very important office. General responsibil-
ity for the development of Department of Defense views in connection with
the preparation of U. S. governmental positions en United Nations matters
also fell under the purview of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs.
Office of North Atlanti c Treaty ' >s—this office acted as the
point of contact within ISA for all natters concerning Department of
Defense interest in the NATO and became the focal point of trie Office of
the Secretary of Defense in these matters with the JOS, the joint secre-
taries, and other agencies designated as executive agencies for joint
service action within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was
this office that was charged with insuring the availability of ti;
strategic advice and recommendations from the Joint Chiefs oT Staff rela-
tive to NATO and for the formulation of plans, policies and courses of
action for the implementation of approved programs in support of estab-
lished U. 5. foreign policy having a bearing on NATO.
Office of Foreign Economic Defense Affairs—the developing and
establishing of Department of Defense policies and programs concerning
the defense interest in the foreign economic affairs of the U. S.
Government, fell to this office. These responsibilities include
developing of coordinated DQD positions on the economic and the techni-
cal assistance provisions of mutual security legislation and i
orders and agreements, covering matters such as' strategic materialsj
technical cooperation (Point IV program); assistance to production; ei
tariff duties. This office was also cl Lth formulatii
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Department position on U. S. policies and programs relative. to the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program and for. developing policies for
DOD intergovernmental economic mobilization planning and for coordinat-
ing the development and monitoring the progress of supporting programs
by the Munitions Board.
Meanwhile in 1950, a memorandum of agreement between the Secre-
taries of Defense, State, Treasury, and the Director, Economic Coopsra-
tion Administration, and approved by the President, had established the
Q
International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC). The Office of the
Director of International Security Affairs, although in the State Depart-
ment, was almost "supra-departmental" since the Director, in his capacity
as Chairman of ISAC, exercised responsibility for the government as a
whole. ISAC thus became the formal mechanism for the interdepartmental
coordination of foreign aid programs and its Director was also the St
Dopartmant's Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, The
Defense Department's focal point for coordinating foreign aid now tec
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
who wa3 '^o provide a Defense Departi.^nt viewpoint for ISAC, as well as
for the NSC. 10
There was a most complex relationship during 1951 ana 1952 amc
the various departments involving the Director for Mutual Security, .
9The Economic Cooperation Administration* was disb'.nded in 1961




[or ] ifjsnjse, (Princeton: Princet
University Press, 1961), p. 253«

13
at the time was Mr. Averell Harriman, and the additional and quite
unique office of the President's Special Representative in Europe. The
Special Representative (initially Mr. william H. Draper) was to act for
the President as the senior U. S. civilian representative and to speak
for the government as a whole. In effect, he possessed a merger of the
authorities of the Secretaries of Defense, State, Treasury, and the
Director for Mutual Security. The Defense Department's focal point
for coordinating aid in this channel was also the Assistant to the
Secretary for International Security Affairs. Defense was usually
represented by someone from the ISA staff on the various inter-depart-
mental groups such as the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Com-
mittee, and the Economic Defense Advisory Committee as well as the
International Security Affairs Committee, which existed at that time. 12
The complicated accounting and budgetary arrangements involved in
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program required the addition of a budget
advisor and a statistical advisor to the Defense Department's Interna-
tional Security Affairs staff. They specialized in international pro-
grams but were responsible to the Def~nse Comptroller's office fcr much
of their clerical and administrative support. This was the first step
toward the creation of an independent ISA Comptroller which was to c^-
later.
11
Arthur MacMahon, Administration in Fog '
^I^JJH* (Tuscaloosa







In February 1953, the Assistant for International Security
Affairs was promoted to the rank of Assistant Secretary of Defense, and
his office underwent still further changes. Later in 1953 > Koorgani:-
tion Plan Mo. 6 to the National Security Act of 1947 abolished the
uri.:ioldy structure of Boards and Committees within the Office of Secre-
tary of Defense. The Munitions Board's Office of International Progra:..,
was transferred to ISA and incorporated within the Office of Foreign
Economic Defense Policy which was now placed under a. new Gffice of
Foreign Economic Affairs. This latter office develc rea branches
which were assigned to work closely with the country officers at the
State Department. The direct liaison that was thus encouraged in 1953
to insure that the Defense Department officials kept abreast of t
currant thinking and developments at State has worked exceptionally
well in recent years.
Other changes brought about in 1953 saw the creation of the
Office of the Director of National Security Council Affairs which
really a strengthening within ISA of the ambry i office of the Deputy
for NSC Affairs in order to Improve coordination with t aional
Security Council. The Director was given greater responsibilities for
a synthesis of Defense Department recommendations on matters to be
13
U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on National Security
Staffing and Opt; rations, Administration of Na i ' ! curity : Part 9
(Washington: Government Print; 'ice, 196/J, pp. 597-99. B
Secretary Rusk and Secretary Icl in letters to the Sub.-
attested to the close coordination, cooj
ing now being achieved between the two dej '-s.
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considered by the Council or on policies and actions of the Council. The
Director also served as the Defense representative on the National Secur-
ity Council Planning Board when this Board was in existence.' f These
functions brought about a marked improvement in integrating the Defense
Department into a larger national security structure.
An important change also in 1954- came about as the result of an
agreement between the Assistant Secretary and the Defense Comptroller
which resulted in the setting up of an independent ISA Comptroller.
This was important because it was a departure from the usual organiza-
tion, and is an arrangement still unique in the Office of the Secretary
15
of Defense.
Another innovation at this time was the International Security
Plan which brought together by country various directives, policies) and
programs concerned with mutual defense assistance. NSC guidance was so
broad that different -agencies interpreted policy in different ways.
There also had been too little coordination between the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the State Department. The plan was designed to overcome juris-
dictional disputes and insure coordination at the departmental le\ j1«
KUpon the disbandment of the Planning Board of NSC in 1961 these
planning duties were absorbed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Planning (ISA), and in 1965 they were placed under the Policy Plannii
Staff of ISA. This staff is no longer headed by a Deputy Assistant
Secretary.
15
The ISA Comptroller today is known ae the Military Assistance





By 1956 the evolution of the ISA organization haa resulted in some
name changes and consolidations. The following major units existed:
(l) The Office of National Security Council Affairs; (2) The Office of
Foreign Military Affairs, (including a Plans Division, a Policy Division
with area branches, a Foreign Economic Defense Division, and the Permanent
Joint Board on Defense (U. S. and Canada); (3) A Comptroller; and (4) The
Office of Military Assistance Programs. The last narr.ad was divided
into a Control Division, which directly supervised the Military Aid
Advisory Groups in Foreign Countries; the Operations Division which
coordinated and processed military aid requirements requested by our
allies and approved by the Joint Chiefs; and the .Procurement and Pro-
duction Division which was concerned with such matters as off-shore pro-
curement.
As the scope and nature of the United States' commitments over-
seas changed, so did ISA's organization. The body not only kapt pace
with, but sometimes exceeded the rest of the Defense Department in being
organized and reorganized. On January 1, 1956 a complete revision was
made by the new assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
Affairs), Mr. Gordon Gray.
The functions already described for the various units of the
organization were in large part reassigned within ISA by Mr. Gray's
reorganization. These were substantially the re co-.ne ndat ions r.ado by
16
Stanley, op . cit. , p. 49.

17
Cresap, McCormick and Padget, Management Consultants of Chicago, who
made a survey of ISA at the request of Mr. Gray in the fall of 1955.
Uppermost among the findings of the Cresap, McCormick and Padget
report, which had the encompassing title Survey of the De fense Repre-
sentative
,




United States Regional Organization and Other Designated Organizations
Closely As sociated with the Operation of Mutual Defense Assistance .Pro-
grams t was the fact that there existed no provision in the organization
for adequate integration of individual country matters and insufficient
coordination for control over the organization as a whole. The basic
organizational sub-division of responsibility between military assistance
and military affairs did net recognize the close relationship that exists
between "Affairs" and "assistance".
The survey pointed out the then existing organizational arrange-
ment overlooked certain fundamental requirements for the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program. First, it did not recognize the difference in
organizational requirements for the various major elements of the pro-
gram. Organizational requirements for the Mutual Weapons Development,
according to Cresap, McCormick and Padget, were entirely different than
those for the end item segment of the Program. Second, the existing
arrangement provided intermediate coordinating or supervisory organiza-
tions which could not work effectively when all major decisions were
made at the Washington level because of the requirements for coordina-
tion between State and Defense on the entire Mutual Assistance Pr< gn .
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Mr. Gray's subsequent reorganization was designed to take more
effective account of the fact that military assistance was becomir..
primary tool for effecting many military as well as politico-economic
decisions in the international field. Military assistance programming
and planning was therefore integrated into offices handling foreign
military affairs pertaining to individual countries. To carry out the
arrangement necessary to effect the desired results, four geographic
Regional Directorates were established to handle international prcble
not normally related to individual country matters; an office to dire
coordinate and control military assistance programs as such; and an
office to combine with National Security Council affairs to provide,
direct and initiate plans projected from two to five years ahead of
approved assistance programs.
Another major addition was an office of Operations Coordinating
Board Affairs which was more accurately a transfer from the Office of
Special Operations. This Office, was designed to perform for the then
existing Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) what the Office of National
Secux Ity Council Affairs did for the NSC. A complete separation of the
International Security Affairs Comptroller from the Defense Department
Comptroller was also finalized by the 1956 reorganization.
Another shortcoming in the organization pointed up by the Cres
McCormick and Padget report was that the Assistant Secretary of Defei
(ISA; did not have the benefit of direct reporting by the in-country
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on country program political
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and economic implications. On the contrary, military assistance aspects
were reported directly to State by its Country Team member. Responsi-
bility for management supervision of the MAA.G organization was thu3
diffused under that concept of organization. As a result of this criti-
cism Regional Directors within ISA were delegated liaison functions with
Military Assistance Advisory Groups. Their establishment as independent
units was a parallel to the State Department organization.
The internal reorganization produced other changes which resulted
in the Plans Division of the old Office of Foreign Military Affairs
becoming the Office of Planning. Foreign Economic Defense responsibili-
ties were transferred to the new Office of Special International Security
Affairs which was charged with preparing Department of Defense policies
on international conferences. Preparing for and arranging Defense repre-
sentation at these conferences became one of ISA's more important tasks,
since the large number of existing collective security pacts required
that Defense participate equally with the State Department. United
States' support of NATO military activities continued as in the past
to be furnished by the military departments whc acted as administrative
agents for the various services. Internationally budgeted support v. .
provided directly by the Secretary of Defense from military assistance
appropriations. The Office of Military Aid Programs was abolished also
at this time and its functions transferred to a new Office of ire .
and Control, which today has been incorporated into the Office of the
Director for Military Assistance.
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While the changes brought about in the orgamization of ISA v/ere
extensive, they reflected the basic finding of the Gresap report th ;
such rearrangements v/ere necessary to assure the ',, efficient and
thorough-going approach to the solution of interna tta.on.al problems from
the standpoint of the Department of Defense. Although deficiencies
resulting from inadequate integration of affairs amd assistance iratters,
duplication, overlapping, lack of coordination and' the like may be cured
by improvements in management, Mr. Grey cautioned that effective results
do not automatically follow from reorganization per: se_. In a memorandum
to the Secretary of Defense in March 1956 concen ;
,
the reorganization
of ISA, Mr. Gray stated that while the rearrangements within ISA were
made in the interest of increasing the overall : izational effective-
ness of ISA, a major factor in the success of any .such reorganization is
bound up in the human equation. Mr. Gray, theref 3, commenced a second
study of ISA which concerned itself with the pro&j sms of personnel. It
was the finding of this second study that the existing staff complement
of ISA was badly overworked. Payroll records ii i that for the
fourteen-week period from 23 October 1955 to 28 J .. ry 1956 ISA reported
a total of 5jl&2 hours overtime. Nearly two-thirds of this amount was
reported for the then eighty secretarial and clerical employees. The
approximate dollar value of this would have paid tfce salaries of ten
additional secretaries. No statistics were mairtv ined on the amount of
overtime put in by the fifty-six military personnel, in ISA, who as
members of the professional staff contributed their share of labor to
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that reflected in the work load carried by the secretarial st^ff.
Because of the work load and overtime requirements, i.'r. Gray reported
that ISA offices were falling steadily behind in their normal perfon
ance, and the standards of work were no up to par and mistakes were
being made. This situation existed in both the profession.'' 1 and secre-
tarial groups. With the element of time compressed by ever mount]
requirements, the number of problems inevitably increased, end Mr. Gray
found that the result in the main tended to jeopardize operational
efficiency, taxed physical endurance, affected morale and debased the
final product. These problems were not new. They existed before reor-
ganization. The reorganisation had simply served to bring them more
distinctly into the open. An example of the increase in the work
was reflected in the tremendous increase (500$) in the number of action
cases resulting from cables coming into ISA within the previous four
months. This load further served to point up the fact that policy making
in the international field in 1956 had become a matter of extreme complex-
ity. The Regional Directorates of ISA had to constantly cope with the
large nrmber of countries in their respective areas; the increasl
Soviet efforts at penetration; the continual problems relating to the
scope and nature of U, S. Allied committments J and the absorbing issues
which were being posed by the then called ''uncommitted nations".
Mr. Gray foresaw the new and recently acquired authorities of ISA
being counterproductive if additional staffing twas not provided. In
1954- and 1955 Department of Defense Directives were promulgated which
effectively increased the responsibility dele, for the f ation,
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administration and control of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program to
ISA. These delegations to ISA greatly increased the requirements f
"knowhew" in every phase of the administration of this progran . \ .-.on
the program originated, control was centered in the various Executive
Agents. The Department of Defer.se sent only broad guidance to the
Services and relied upon spot checks to effect control. In 19^6 '.
directed the operation and consequently had to be fully prepared to back
up its actions. This was not a product of Mr. Gray's reorganization.
It was nevertheless intensified by it because the rearrangements incrc:
the ability of ISA to program more accurately and to focus upon all
aspects of Military Assistance from policy formulation through deliveries.
Without additional staffing Mr. Gray also foresaw the danger of
the basic reasons for establishing the Regional Directorates being
negated because time denied the professional personnel the opportunity
to inform themselves properly as country experts. The process of simply
keeping informed of the military, political and economic and psychologi-
cal situation in a given area was essential if ISA were to perform pro-
perly. Under the working condition existing in early 1956 time fcr dis-
cerning thought simply did not exist. An essential aspect of the problem
was the need -for time to be spent away from Washington to. make field
trips to familiarise the professional r of ISA with the areas
which were the basis of day to day activities in the office. Althou
it was necessary to make the effort, Mr, Gra; - his I
could ill afford to sacrif time of its princij
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members at international conferences even when t) presence fulfilled
the need for official U. S. representation.
It was because of concerns such as this tl . A. Gray asked for
and was authorized the addition of twenty-nine professional and twenty-
four secretarial personnel.
The operation of the Office of Internationa rarity Affairs,
more than most other organizations has varied wide y under different
officials. Each Assistant Secretary who has ser. in ISA since 1950
has changed something of its organization. The g important changes
have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. .A further detailed
analysis of each of these internal changes would contribute signi-
ficantly to any clearer picture of ISA's function:: so I shall not
burden the reader further in this regard. For the most part, the
internal changes have been designed to improve the over-all contribu-
tion made by the Office and have tended to strenj :: the working
relationships with State and other Departments.

CHAPTER III
.Today, the Office of the Assistant Secretary cf Defense for
International Security Affairs has a staff of 300 people including
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, v/ho is the "Vice President" in
the organization, six additional Deputy Assistant Secretaries, a Direc-
tor of Military Assistance and 168 professional and project officers of
which 67 ere military officers fron all branches of the Armed Forces.
The current charter for the Office of International Security
Affairs designates the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISa) as the
principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the functional
17field of international security. Under the provisions cf the charter
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is assigned the following
functions in his assigned field of responsibility:
1. Monitor Department of Defense participation in National
Security Council Affairs, including development, coordination
and recommendation cf the positions 01 and the provision of
staff support for the Defense member on the Council.
2. Assist the Secretary of Defense, the several components
of the Department of Defense and other agencies of the
government in establishing defense policies by:
17
Department of Defense Directive, Number 5132.2 of May 20, 1961.
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a. Determining through continuous study of the world
situation the current end emerging international prob-
lems of major significance to the security of the United
States, and analyzing the range of possible politico-
military actions for dealing with the long-term aspects
of such problems;
, b. Identifying the national security objectives of the
United States and developing the international politico-
military and foreign economic implications of currently
approved, new or alternative programs of force structures,
weapons systems and other military capabilities designed
to attain those objectives; and
c. Presenting this information in such form as will help
identify basic international security issues, alternative
policies and appropriate criteria of choice.
3. Initiate appropriate actions and measures within the "l-
ment of Defense implementing approved National Security Council
policies.
4. Develop and coordinate Defense positions, policies, plans
and procedures in the fields of international politieo-milit
and foreign economic affairs, including arras control and disar
ment, cf interest to the Department of Defense with respect to
negotiate . I monitoring of agreement with foreign governments
and international organizations en military facilities, operating
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rights, status of forces and other international politico-
military matters.
5. Provide policy guidance, as appropriate, to components
of the Department of Defense, DOD representatives on Unit
States Missions and to international organizations and confer-
ences*
6. Develop, coordinate and establish Department of Defense
positions, plans and procedures pertaining to the Military
Assistance Program, and supervise, administer and direct the
Military Assistance Program, and other activities of interest
to the Department under the Mutual Security Frogra .
7. Plan, organize and monitor the activities of Military
Assistance Advisory Groups, including joint United States
military advisory groups and training missions insofar as
they concern military assistance functions. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ISA) is assigned staff responsibility
for direct communication with unified and specified commands
on matters relating to the Military Assistance Program.
In the performances of these functions, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA) is charged with:
1. Coordinate actions as appropriate with the military depart-







agencies having collateral or related functions in the field of his
assigned responsibility.
2. Maintain active liaison for the exchange of information and
advice with the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
other Department of Defense agencies.
3. Coordinate relations between the Department of Defense and
the Department of State in the field of his assigned responsibility.
4.. Make full use of established facilities in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and other Defense agencies.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate and is vested with
the necessary authority by the Secretary of Defense to perform his
assigned functions.
The principal working divisions within ISA today to assist the
19
Assistant Secretory in performing his functions are:
1. Office of Policy Planning and Arms Control
2. Office of Africa and western Hemisphere Affairs
3. Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
4. Office of European and NATO Affairs
5. Office of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
6. Office of Director of Military Assistance
7. Office of International Logistics Negotiations
39
See Figure 2, p. 28.
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Office of Policy Planning and Arms Control
The principal Division within this office is the Policy Planni
Staff. The Planning Staff is organized with separate assistants for
Economic Affairs, Strategic Planning, Counter-insurgency, Southeast
Asian Affairs, Latin American and African Affairs. The Policy Planning
Staff is often likened to the Policy Planning Council of the State
Department, but in its actual functions it is more operational than a
planning body. In addition to being the Department of Defense focal
point for contributions to and clearance of National Policy Papers and
contingency studies, the Policy Planning Staff is charged with current
operational responsibilities in the following fields:
a. Principal advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (j
on politico-military matters in the USSR and Eastern European
Communist countries (except Yugoslavia, which is under the Euro-
pean Directorate).
b. Responsible for DOD input and support of continuing work of
the Special Committee of the NATO Defense Ministers.
c. Acts as the focal point within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for development end coordination of DOD positions on
matters under consideration by the Senior Interdepartmental
Group (SIG), including counter-insurgency policies and programs.
Distribution of decisions made by the SIG and the monitoring of




d. Prepares DOD positions and coordinates on other economic
matters of interest to the DOD, including preparation of economic
analyses and World-wide and Country Economic Data Sheets for inclu-
sion in the annual Congressional Presentations Documents as requi
by the Director of Military Assistance.
e. Coordinates DOD policy matters and positions in connection
with United Nations activities other than those dealing with
arms and trade control, end serves as the monitor for DOD aspects
of the preparation of international security plans, including
United States collective defense arrangements.
In addition to the above operational type functions the Policy
Planning Staff involves itself with such endeavors as foreign disaster
relief; international aspects of outer space; Arctic and Antarctic
Affairs; external research projects which have international security
aspects; security review of transcripts of Congressional testimony;
focal point for DOD position on future control of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands; and all actions that do not clearly fall within
the area of responsibility of other ISA offices.
20
The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIGJ was established in
1966 to assist the Secretary of State in discharging his authority and
responsibility for interdepart 1 matters. Its .•ship consists
of the Undersecretary of State who is the Executive Chairman, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Lnistrator of the Agency for Internatic:
Development, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director
of USIA and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security
/iffairs. The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) formed in 1961 1
abolished with the establishment of the SIG.

Although the Policy Planning Council does conduct politico-
military studies in support of other ISA directorates and does advise
on emerging basic problems in world situations and possible DOD courses
of action the major portion of its effort is operational and reactive to
present day situations and crises. This Council played a large support-
ing role to the Ad Hoc Committees established by President Kennedy to
deal with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The then Assistant Secre-
tary for International Security Affairs, Mr. Paul Nitze, was a key mem-
ber of the President's Ad Hoc Committees and as such employed the
resources of this office extensively during these few critical days.
Also within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Plans and Arms Control is a Special Assistant for Foreign Economic
Affairs who is responsible for keeping abreast of economic pclicj.es and
economic defense policies in all foreign countries including those of
the Sino-Soviet sphere. In addition to these functions the Office of
Foreign Economic Affairs is concerned with the implementation of the
Fcod-for-Peace programs, including Public Lav/ ^80.
Public Law 4.8G, 83rd Congress, "The Agricultural Trace Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954'S provides for the sale of surplus agri-
cultural commodities to certain foreign countries nho pay for the co-
ties in their own currencies. To implement the eg] . . ts negoti; t
under this Act, an Inter-agency Staff Co.nnittee on Agricultural Surplus
Disposal (the ISC) was formed. Ten agencies inclu Li Agriculture, Sti I ,
Commerce, Treasury, the International Cooperation Lnistration, ] u

32
of the Budget, the Office of Emergency Planning, USIA, the Export-Import
Bank, and Defense, participate in the work of this Committee. The Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense ( ISA), in particular the Office of
Foreign Economic Affairs, represents the Office of the Secretary of
?1
Defense (OSD) and the three military departments on the ISC. The
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Comptroller is the alternate
DOD representative on the ISC.
In addition to general authority provided by P. L. 480, Defense
and other ISC participating agencies are given certain administrative
authority pursuant to Executive Order 10,708, . dated May 6, 1957. Under
these directives, the Department of Defense is given specific responsi-
bilities in authorizing and programming foreign currency uses under
subsections 104(c) (common Defense grants) and 104(f) (Payment of U. S.
obligations) of the Act. Under DOD Directive the Office of Assistnat
Secretary of Defense (ISA) is given Defense responsibility for develop-
ment and execution of all international security programs relating to
plans for the use of foreign currencies generated by sales of surplus
agricultural commodities. The Department of Defense has primary respon-
sibility for the use of approximately 20$ of the local currencies
00
generated pursuant to Title I, P. L. J+aQ. About 5% of this is used
21
PS±L Participation in the Impiementat ion of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 19
,
5,4, f as Amended , (P. L. 4.80 )







for military family housing projects overseas. The remainder is ;
has been used for a variety of items such as: supplemental funds for
Inter-American Geodetic Survey mapping in foreign lands; purchasing
certain defense items overseas such as Austrian aluminum powder; pur-
chase of military vehicles manufactured in Japan to replace U. S. manu-
factured ones; and for the purchase of military consumables oversees
such as spare parts for indigenous armies. There are to date agre
and negotiating instructions in existence for mere than forty-five coun-
tries.
Office c f African and V(e stern Hemisphere Affairs
The Regional Directorates maintain, primary DOD liaison with tl
Department of State; AID; the Joint Staff; Defense Intelligence Agency;
Military Assistance Advisory Groups; Military Departments J and other
OSD components such as Administration, Comptroller, Installations and
Logistics, Pub] ic Affairs, Systems Analysis and Legislative Affairs on
all country and regional matters in their assigned areas. The regional
directorates also participate in policy development and activities of
international organizations as they partain to their areas. It is the
regional directorates which represent the Department of Defense in staff
consultations with the Department of State and other governmental agen-
cies on matters of regional interest including but not restricted to
issues such as Military Assistance Programs and Military Export Sales
policies. Although the regional divisions within ISA are very simi]
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to those maintained in the Department of State variations do occur fr
time to tine within the ISA organization.
One of the most recent rearrangements (August 1967) within ISA is
the bringing together of the Directorate for African Affairs and Western
Hemisphere Affairs under one Deputy Secretary. Such rearrangements occur
within ISA with great regularity and ere prompted by a desire to distri-
bute the responsibilities ana work load more evenly among the six Deputy
Assistant Secretaries, as well as to better utilize the expertise avail-
able. The organizational structure of ISA is in no way considered to be
sacrosanct and close coordination among all branches of the organization
is maintained and encouraged which, as will be pointed out later, is
most important to the overall functioning and effectiveness of ISA. This
close coordination similarly contributes in no small measure to the ease
of reorganizing the structure when personnel and emphasis changes occ-. «
The Directorate for Africa directs the development and coordina-
tion of all DOD policies pertaining to the countries of Africa and the
Malagasy Republic with the exception of the United Arab Republic which
falls within th<~ purview of the Directorate for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs. The Directorate for Western Hemisphere Affairs has simi-
lar responsibilities for the countries of the Western Hemisphere, except
Canada, but including the Islands in the Caribbean. Canada because of
its participation in the North Atlantic Alliance is a responsibility of
the Directorate for the European Region.
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Office of Near Eastern and Sou Lrs
The Directorate for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs is organ-
ized into three Divisions. There is an office for Greece, Turkey, and
Cyprus affairs j a Near East office which is further divided under an
assistant for Israel, United Arab ftepublic, Lebanon, and Syria; and an
assistant for Jordon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden affairs.
A South Asia office comprises the third division and its responsibilities
are distributed between an assistant for India, Ceylon, Nepal, Bhutan,
Sikkam, and the Maldives; and an assistant for Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan
and CENTO affairs.
Office of European and NATO Affairs
The development and coordination cf all DOD policies pertaining
to the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, with the exception cf
Greece and Turkey, and in addition the countries of Austria, Yugoslavia,
Switzerland, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Malta ana Berlin are the
responsibility of the Directorate for European and NATO affairs. This
office in addition to performing functions similar to the other Direc-
torates participates in all policy development and activities of NATO
including the nuclear planning groups. The Office is therefore separated
into three groups—Country Affairs, NATO Affairs, and Nuclear Planning
Affairs, end each is headed by a Deputy Director.
Office of Iv ist Asia and Pacific Affa irs
The Directorate for East Asian and Pacific regions is responsible





countries of the region except the USSR, which as already mentioned is
a responsibility of the Policy Planning Council. Specifically th<
include Korea, Nationalist China, Chinese Peoples Republic , Laos,
Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Phillippines, Japan and Ryukyus, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Pacific Non-Trust Terri-
tories and Vietnam. In addition to these country responsibilities all
10D interests in the SEATO and ANZUS alliance matters are focused through
this office. It is interesting to note that the Director for this region
is a Navy Rear Admiral and that ten of the fourteen professionals in the
directorate are military officers. This is by far the largest concentra-
tion of military officers within a Regional Directorate.
It may be noted that the majority of the countries in this region
are recipients o£ military assistance and a significant amount of MAP
matters are handled daily by this office.
The Office of the Director of ;.!ilitary
-
Assistance
Perhaps one of the most significant branches of ISA today is the
Office of the Director of Military Assistance which has replaced the
Office of Programming and Control established in 1956, which in turn
replaced the then existing Office of Military Aid Programs. The title
for this office has thus come full circle, and again represents more
nearly its actual function.
The creation of a Director of Military As :;ce in the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
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was a port of the many new administrative procedures incorporated into
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which largely came into being es a
result of recommendations of the Draper Committee.
The Draper Committee was created by President Eisenhower in
November 195B under the full name of "President's Committee to Stud;
U. S. Military Assistance Program". This Committee was chaired by
23
William II. Draper. ' The Draper Study was not the first on this subject.
During the 1950' s there were fifteen major studies, but the Draper Report
was the most comprehensive, scholarly, and definitive and it did result
in extensive changes in aid legislation. 24-
The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 replaced the Mutual
Security Act of 195A, and completely revised the basic legislation that
had governed the conduct of both military and economic assistance. This
new legislation, as already pointed cut, was the product of a critically
comprehensive and independent review and evaluation of current problems
of national security, foreign policy actions taken in the past, and the
legislation and organisational procedures that had governed the previous
application of U. 3. assistance. This Act wa j amended in 1962, 1963
again in 1966.
In essense, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, was
designed to give new vigor, purpose and direction to the foreign aid
-'The other members were: Dillon Anderson, Jc ; "'. Dodge,
Alfred M. Gruenther, Marx Leva, John J. McCloy, George McGhee, Joseph
T. McNarney, Arthur W. Radford, and J^r.e-s L. Y,;ebb.
k'ios a. Jordon, Jr., For ' Aid and the Def ' £




program. Comprehensive programs of assistance to friendly foreign coun-
tries were authorized under the new Act which:
provides the authorization for programs of economic
assistance to other nation?- (Part I);
authorizes military assistance to friendly countries
and international organisations (Part II); and
contains a variety of general administrative and
miscellaneous provisions.
Although changes relative to military assistance were mere limited
than those in the economic sphere, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 did
effect certain changes in the methods of financing and administering
military assistance.
Responsibility for the overall coordination of the Military Assis-
tance Program with the foreign policy of the United States is vested in
the Department of State. The responsibilities of the Secretary of State
for military assistance are set forth in Sec. 622 (c) of the Act which
states:
Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of
State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision
and general direction of the assistance programs authorized
by this Act, including but not limited to determining whether
there shall be a military assistance program for a country
and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are
effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the for-
eign policy of the United States is best served thusly.
It is, thereby, the Secretary of State who makes the determination
for the President as to which countries qualify for the assistance under
the Foreign Assistance Act and that it is within U. S. foreign policy
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and defense interests to grant the aid. The Secretary of State after
making these determinations advises the Secretary of Defense who init-
iates the action to program the delivery of the military assistance.
The Secretary of Defense is charged under the Act with the follow-
ing military assistance functions:
Determination of military end-item requirements
j
Procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its
integration with service programs;
Supervision of end-item use by recipient countries;
Supervision of the training of foreign military personnel;
Movement and delivery of military end-items;
Establishment of priorities in procurement, delivery, and
allocation of military equipment; and
Any other functions within the Department of Defense with
respect to the furnishing of military assistance. 25
The Secretary of Defense has delegated most of these military
assistance functions to various elements within the Department of
Defense, but general authority to act for the Secretary of Defense in
military assistance matters is delegated to tne Assistant Secretary of
Defense/International Security Affairs, subject to the direction,
authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. In this regard the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is charged with responsibility for
25
Foreign As nee Act of 1961, Fart II, Sec. 623. Hereinafter
the Act will be referred to as the .. .
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the development, coordination, and establishment of procedures pertain-
ing to the Military Assistance Program; supervising, administering
directing the Program; and planning, organizing and monitoring the activi-
ties of Military Assistance Advisory Groups. The Director of Military
Assistance, within the ISA organization, is assigned the responsibilities
for the carrying out of these functions.
Although the Director of Military Assistance (DMA) acts for the
ASD(ISA) in military assistance matters, and is responsible for all mili-
tary assistance activities of the Department of Defense, the Regional
Directors in ISA are also responsible for providing the DMA with advice
and assistance, and, in conjunction with the appropriate Division within
the DMA's office, for taking action on natters pertaining to the politico-
military aspects of military assistance in their respective geographical
areas. The Regional Directors in turn provide the focal point v/ithin ISA
on area and country military assistance matters with the Joint Staff,
Regional Offices of the Department of State and other appropriate agenc
On the other hand, actions which require primary coordination with the
individual military departments or the Coordinator's Office in the
Agency for International Development are the responsibility of the DMA.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have several specific responsi-
bilities in connection with the administration of military aid programs
which include recommending military objectives, force objectives, scale
of equipping and priorities, both on a country'and an area basis. Acco:
ingly, the JCS is charged with continuous review to assure that
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Military Assistance Programs are in consonance with global security
plans, and that military assistance resources are being distributed
most effectively in promoting U. S. strategic concepts. In instances
where the supply situation is such that priorities for allocation of
material among the recipient nation, or between the recipient nations
and U. S. forces, must be established, the recommendation of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is sought.
On the basis of recommendations made by the military departments,
the Joint Chiefs nominate officers for positions as Chiefs of the Mili-
tary Assistance Advisory Groups. In this particular sphere of activity,
the Joint Chiefs recommend to the Secretary of Defense the manpower i
organizational requirements of the various MAAG's and recommend the
Service to provide the Chief of each MAAG.
All military assistance guidance, plans and programs are also
referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendation.
All directives and communications to the Unified Commands, ^" the mili-
tary departments, and to the Military Assistance Advisory Groups which
psrtain to military assistance affairs and have strategic or mi] itary
operational implications, are coordinated with the Joint Staff. Lite-
wise JCS directives and communications to the same agencies, which
A unified command is a joint force of units from two or more of
the military services under the command of one officer, and is respon
for specific military operations within a given geographical area. There
are seven unified commands throughout the world.
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pertain to military assistance affairs, are required to be coordins tea
with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). The Joint
Staff has a Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs to provide
the staff • support for these activities.
The military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force) in their turn
are charged by the Secretary of Defense for preparing the data necessary
for the development of programs and budget estimates, and for providing
advice and recommendations for changes in programs, in accordance with
instructions of the ASD/ISA with respect to cost, availability, source
of supply, delivery forecasts and funding requirements. Subsequently,
the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force procure and deliver to
the programmed recipients the material and services included in approved
and funded programs.
The Services also provide the MAAG's and the Unified Commands,
as appropriate, with such technical military advice relating to weapons
systems, tactics and doctrine, and pertinent information as may be
required to carry out their assigned responsibilities. Each Military
Department, in respect to the are^ or areas assigned to it, is also
responsible for providing administrative support to Unified Commands
and MAAG's subject to the direction and policy guidance of the Director
of Military Assistance. These functions are all performed in close
coordination and cooperation with the Director of Military Assistance
in ISA v;ho maintains extensive Operations, Plans and Programs Brand:. .
which are charged with reviewing and evaluating the results of prior
year programs, current year programs, and future year plannj
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As a result of the implementation of the Itoaper Committee recom-
mendations, many of the responsibilities formerly exercised separately
by the military deportments were delegated to the. Unified Commanders.
This change has permitted integration of military assistance activities
before the point of State -Defense review is reachted. The Unified Comman-
der is required to integrate the MAP with regiom .1 U. S. defense planning.
The Unified Commanders command and superviise the activities of the
G*s in their area of responsibility. These fUmctions include: recom-
mendations to the JCS ana Director of Military Assistance on the appro-
priate size and functions of MAAG's J direction an.d supervision of sub-
mission of military assistance planning and programming data and budj
data for administrative support programs; provision of necessary techni-
cal assistance and support (in conjunction v/ith tlihe military departments);
and, general supervision of the MAAG's in carrying out their various
assigned functions.
The Unified Commanders further provide an .intermediate level of
policy guidance and review between the Department of State and Defense
and tht MAAG's. As such they recor.anend to the Seaoaretary of Defense
changes in Military assistance program country guiidance, program levels
and content, and the time-phasing of material deliveries and training
programs. Based upon military guidance issued by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Unified Commanders issue detailed mil cy guidance to the




In summary, the Unified Commander exercises supervision over all
the functions of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups. It is only
on technical end administrative matters that the MAAG's may communicate
directly with the respective military departments. For ail other
matters, the line of command to the Department of Defense is through
the Unified Commander.
The Chiefs of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups are repre-
sentatives of the Secretary of Defense in the countries to which they
are accredited. However, as representatives of the United States in
another nation, they are subject to the authority of the Chief of the
United States Diplomatic Mission. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
specifically provides that the Chief of the Mission
shall make sure that recommendations of all such (all U. S.)
representatives pertaining to military assistance are coor-
dinated with the. political and economic considerations and
his comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so
desires. 23
Acting under the supervision of the Unified Commands, MAAG's
have the following responsibilities:
Make recommendations to the Unified Commander concerning
military assistance in their respective countries.
Develop military assistance plans and programs, in coopera-
tion with the Ambassador, and submit them to the Unified
Commands.
27ZM> op.cit.. Sec. 622.

Observe and report on the utilization of material furnishel
and personnel trained by the military assistance program.
Administer military assistance sales transactions.
Provide advisory services and technical assistance to
recipient countries.
Arrange for the receipt and transfer of military assis-
tance material. •
In countries whore no MAAG establishment exists Service Training
Missions may be assigned MAAG functions. In these instances, the Com-
manders of Unified Commands will call upon the appropriate designated
Mission Chief to provide the necessary information and assistance required
to conduct a Military Assistance Program within such country. In several
countries which receive military assistance en a limited scale, a U. S.
Military Attache is charged with the responsibility of the MAP adminis-
tration.
The precise status of MAAG personnel in host countries varies
according to the provisions of the applicable Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreements with each country, the host country's interpretation of
privileges and immunities accorded under international law and comity,




Pull diplomatic status is generally granted to the Chief
and to the senior Army, Navy and Air Force Officers, A second category
of personnel, usually the remaining commissioned members of the MAAG,
enjoy the same privileges and immunities, except inclusion on the "Dip-
lomatic Lists". A third category of personnel, normally the non-commis-
sioned MAAG personnel, are accorded the same status as the clerical
personnel of a Diplomatic Mission. It might be mentioned here that the
key personnel who have been selected for MAAG assignments undergo a four
week course of instruction at the military Assistance Institute in
Washington, D. C. The course at the Institute includes study in the
field of U. S. foreign policy, orientation briefings on the country
where the individual is being assigned, background briefings on the
MAP and MAAG operations, and certain specialized training for progri
officers.
Nov; let us examing the planning and programming procedures for
Military Assistance and the role of the Director of Military Assistance
in these procedures.
The annual Military Assistance Program on which the President's
budget and appropriation request is based are predicated on what has been
decided as to the military requirements to meet long-term U. S. foreign
policy ana strategic objectives as well as a pragmatic av/areness of what
the Congress will support in assistance monies. The annual program sub-
mitted to Congress represents that portion of 'a long-: pi; n end
program which must be funded in the fiscal yeer for which apprc bion
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is requested in order to ensure delivery of material and services when
needed to meet agreed plans for activating, modernizing or maintaining
the allied military forces involved. The procedures briefly are:
Policy objectives and order of itude dollar guidelines are
transmitted to the Unified Commanders by the Director of Military Assis-
tance accompanied by appropriate procedural guidance. The Director of
Military Assistance also provides the Unified Commanders with a detailed
listing of the articles and services which are available for the MAP.
Strategic guidance is transmitted to the Unified Commanders by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Based on this guidance and any supplementary instructions of the
Unified Commanders, each Military Assistance Advisory Group, with the
assistance of the other members of the Country Team, provides the Uni-
fied Commander with information required for development of the country
plans and programs. The views of the U. S. Ambassador are provided to
the Unified Commanders and to the Department of State.
The Unified Commander's military assistance plan and program
recommendations are submitted to the Director of Military Assistance.
The Director of Military Assistance distributes these pltn and
program recommendations to the Military Departments for review of
pricing, lead time, and availabilities; to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for review for consistency with U. S. strategic plans J and to the
Department of State, the Agency for Int Ldnal Development, and the
Bureau of the Budget for policy review and coordination.
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The annual budget year program which takes into account (a) the
priorities of the international military political situation, (b) the
availabilities and lead time of military material and services, and
(c) the resources expected to be available is then developed. The Mili-
tary Assistance Comptroller in the Office of the Director of Military
Assistance, as mentioned earlier, is now a separate agent from the
Office of the Defense Department Comptroller. The Budget Division within
the Military Assistance Comptroller's office is responsible for the coor-
dination and review of all reports received from the JCS, the individual
services and the MAAG's themselves concerning the costs and budget esti-
mates for the implementation of the variaus military assistance programs
that are either in existence or proposed to be established in the indi-
vidual countries. It is this Budget Division that prepares the proposals
for the Secretary of Defense that are in turn sent to the Bureau of the
Budget to be incorporated in the President's Budget.
The President establishes the amount of new obligational author-
ity to be included in his Budget, and submits it to the Congress.
After completion of Congressional action, the annual program and
the long-range plan and program are adjusted to conform to the actual
appropriation and revised as necessary to reflect any changes in the
conditions under which it was originally developed and approved. Final
approval for implementation of the annual program is then obtained from




The Director of Military Assistance issues Military Assists
Program orders and other instructions to the Military Departments,
together with appropriate fund allocations.
The Military Departments take supply end procurement action,
effect deliveries of material to the countries, and provide training
end other services. Utilization of material by recipients is super-
vised by the MAAG's.
As the occasion warrants, the Director of Military Assistance
receives recommendations for changes in the approved program from the
Unified Commanders, the JCS, and other agencies and adjusts the program
to conform with changes in supply availability, the international
situation and to U. S. national security objectives.
Forecasts and reports of deliveries and performance are submitted
periodically by the Military Departments to the Director of Military
Assistance and distributed to the Unified Commanders and MAAG's.
Also within the Military Assistance Comptroller's office is a
Finance and Accounting Division whose responsibility is to keep abreast
of the actual expenditures of funds and to provide the necessary . scis-
tance to the Inspector General, Foreign Assistance who under the provi-
sions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is charged with the task for
continuous audits and review of the efficiency and economy of programs,
determination that the program is in compliance with applicable lai .
28
and evaluation of program effectiv ss. «
28
FAA . op . cit .. Sec. 624 (a).
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The Inspector General, Foreign Assistance has his office in the
State Department and is advised by the Secretary of State of the
latter' s decision to grant military assistance at the same time that the
Secretary of Defense is similarly advised.
The system for administering military aid may seen, somewhat
complicated but it has virtues which were not available in earlier
programming. The most important improvement over previous systems is
th&t there is a coorelation of responsibility and the program is
reviewed by all echelons from the Secretary of State down to the MAAG's.
Each echelon has the opportunity to review the feasibility of the pro-
grams and make re commendations , and coordination is provided by the
Director of Military Assistance in ISA.
OffIce _ of International Logistic Negotiations
The U. S. International Logistics Negotiations (ILN) program,
better known as Military Assistance Sales, has come to the attention of
the public through the press in particular as a result of the 1965
Pakistan-India confrontation over Kashmir, and more recently with t
involvement of the Export-Import Bank loans with arms purchases and
through the objections of the Congress to the $^00 million revolving
fund maintained by the Department of Defense to finance arms sales.
The Military Export Sales program conducted by the 25-man Office
of International Logistics Negotiations is headed by Mr. Henry J. Kuss, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA/ILN). This office has been in
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existence since June 1962 attempting to associate Industry and Defeni
in a scorch for an understanding to the problems involved in brcader.-
military exports and to act as a point of coordination for the solution
to these problems.
The specific interest of the Department of Defense in the Military
Export Sales Program is stated in the following three objectives:
1. To promote the defensive strength of our allies consistent
with our own politico-economic objectives.
2. Promote the concept of cooperative logistics and standardi-
zation with our allies.
3. Offset the unfavorable balance of payments resulting from
U. S. military deployments abroad.
The magnitude of the first objective is illustrated by the feci
that in the ten year period 1952-61 Congress end the Executive Branch
approved the expenditure of over v-17 billion in foreign assiste.nce to
promote the defensive strength of our Allies. In fiscal year 1961
alone, the military Grant Aid program of the Department of Defense
amounted to $1, C5 billion. Military sales accounted for only ^630
million, or less then half those of the grant program. At the end of
fiscal year 1966, Grant Aid stood at £824. million while the military
arms sales had skyrocketed to $1,937 billion, or 235^ of the aid pre,
While the financia] capability of many of our Allies has made it
unnecessary for the Congress and the Executive, Branch to continue appro-
priating money for the payment of exports to some of these Allies, tl
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objective of promoting their defensive strength through exports 1.
remained part of U. S. policy. Export sales is envisioned by the
Department of Defense as a plan to substitute finesse for largesse in
foreign military logistics. One Air Force Colonel expressed it by
saying, "these military ties can join with the economic and cultural
interests to form strong bonds that will hold firm underneath the froth
29frequently stirred up at the diplomatic level".
Experience in Europe in recent years has indicated to the Depart-
ment of Defense that the potential for the second objective, standardi-
zation, has increased several hundred times with, the increased indus-
trial participation of U. S. and foreign companies in design and
production of military equipment. Because of this participation,
aircraft, missile systems, and support equipment are more common to the
30
United States and European logisti.es systems than ever before.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Kuss recently pointed out that :
We've worked harder than probably any other military force on
maintenance problems. Yet, like the old equipment we were
giving away, the logistics systems and maintenance guidelines
were cut-dated. In effect wo were developing our own support
systems one way, selling our allies support in another way-
even though in war time five U. S. divisions and seven divi-
sions from another nation would be fighting in the field side
by side, reporting to the same commander. International
support-ability by itself would be worth a premium price.
By optimising export, sales, we tend tov.ard achieving it
without having to buv it. 31
29
Armed Forces i;'?.na;-er.er.t t Vol. 11 No. ,4, (January, 1 965) , p. 28.
Henry J. Kuss, Aerospace
,
Vol. 2 No. lr (Winter l?6,j, p. 1/..
31
Armed Fj nt, loc.jjit.
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The overseas expenditures of U. S. forces in the last ft
;
rs
have constituted a drain on U. S. international balance of payments in
an amount approximately equal to the deficiency. One of the major
acticns taken since 1962 to offset this deficiency has been the promo-
tion of military exports consistent with the political and economic
objectives to meet the defense objectives of our Allies. Mr. Kuss, in
talking to the International Editor of Armed Forces Management magazine
in January 1967, explained the value of military sales to cur balance
of payment deficits in this way:
From the military point of view our ability to deploy forces
abroad and pay the foreign exchange costs cf these forces is
in part made possible by the dollar receipts of our Services
frcm their military sales, for it is the net foreign exchange
cost that is considered in our national defense gold budget
—
and in this net calculation—do ycu realize that it takes
$160 million of trade to compensate for every /V > 0C0 mar:
U. S. Army division slice in Europe. This means a total of
v960 million in trade to compensate for our Army troops in
Europe. Some 1320 million in trade additionally to compen-
sate for our Air Force troops in Europe and some £160 million
in trade to compensate for our Naval forces in Europe—for
these are the amounts of dollars that European countries
actually receive as a result of the foreign exchange expendi-
tures of cur forces abroad. I am sure that ycu can see the
important relationship of trade income and economic ability
to deploy . . .32
Export receipts in 1966 were 41 percent cf defense expenditures
abroad and brought the net adverse effect of U. S. Department of Defense
expenditures down to $1.7 billion from a high of ^3 billion in 1961.
32Armed Forces Man; it, Vol. 13 No. 4 (January 1967), p. 46.
33Kuss, loc.cit.

The goal sot by the Office of ILN in 1962 was to maintain a vl.l
billion cash receipt level through the rest of the sixties. This goal
has been exceeded, end §11.1 billion of arras have been sold over the past
five years. ILN attributes a good deal of the success of this program
to the support of the military departments.
The cooperative logistics support aspect is what has motivated
the Army to work hard on the program. Brigadier General Howard Eggleston,
Army Deputy Chief of Staff/Logistics Director for International Logistics
has stated:
If we are really sincere about having viable allies, we must
do this. Our policy is that logistics support is a national
responsibility but an ally can buy his way into cur system as
part of a hardware procurement. And. when he does, he gets a
good deal for the price he pays. 35
The Navy sees the export sales program as a means to exert U. S.
military influence on developed countries. The Navy is now selling twice
as much as they are giving away and the Navy's projected sales figures
are going up. The Navy feels its two big selling points are quality
plus support effort. The U. S. has built a reputation for feeling more
of a responsibility along support lines, and even though the U. 5. price
may be higher than the competition, foreign navies are buying from the
U. S. because they want the back-up which goes with each purchase.
Armed Forces t, Vol. 11 No. L, (J -y 1965), p. 28.
35 Ibid.

Philosophically, the Air Force pees the values developing out of
an export sales program in compatible overseas ground environments;
equipment standardization essential to successful combined operation in
emergencies; joint acceptance of strategic tactical concept and doctrii
built around common hardware; truly complimentary forces in different
nations; and common, interchangeable logistics.
Still the Air Force considers their proper role in expert sales
as one supplementing rather than leading the activities of industry.
Air Force Colonel Stan Johnson, former Chief of Air Force Military
Sales Branch has stated:
Our biggest contribution to the program can be made in drawing
together with our allies a closer relationship in tactics, opera-
tions, support and equipment maintenance, making sure they have
all the facts available about U. S. hardware and production
capabilities before making a buying decision.
It is not implied from the above that the Services have been
lethargic over the program. On the contrary, individuals in each mili-
tary department have, according to the people in ILN, set some impres-
sive records. While they support ILN ' s effort to a greater extent than
they initiate their own sales endeavors, the services' expertise and
resources make them invaluable. Nevertheless, military sales exports
represent a break with traditional service oriented conservatism which
has in the psst not been associated with commercial overtures.
Another aspect of the program which is a key tenet to its succ
is to bring industry more actively into the program. In contrast to
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what might be expected ILN has found the economy and trio nation ere
just not geared to military exports. A great deal of effort has and is
being expended to convince the heads of many U. S. companies that the
export market is worth investigating.
Military sales are not and never have teen very much like commer-
cial sales overseas. According to Mr. Kuss, military sales are deeply
imbedded in military-political thinking. In military sales it is neces-
sary to think like an ally, for instance on the tactical use of tanks,
or the firepower vs. armament trade offs. One of the primary sales
resources then becomes the military man in the field of contact with
military allies.
The members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (1.L-.AG)
provide this contact; one of ILN's most important tasks is to help
bring the military men of the two countries together.
Another important aspect of the program is the effort for improved
management. Some of the relatively simple roadblocks, i.e. getting a
military expert liscense, obtaining the necessary clearances to send
people overseas have been streamlined. But getting the word to the M
man in the field on what is expected of him is a communitions exercise
that is still being perfected. The military man in the field must be
flexible. Imagination, initiative, and intelligence are more important
than any specific guidance from ILN because no two sales are alike.
The sale of military equipment to foreign customers differs from
selling commercial products in many which influence the structure
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of the sales team and its methods. First, in general terms, the cus-
tomer is always a government cf another country or specifically its
armed forces or internal security arm. Second, the- sale of arms and
their purchase are strictly controlled by all governments of the world.
Third, the market environment is of critical importance. The political
climate, the economic situation of the customer country ana the stabil-
ity of its armed forces demand more attention from defense salesmen
than the sale of commercial goods normally would from commercial
salesmen.
How the System of Military Sales Works
Within the United States Government, the Department of Defense
is the key agency responsible for foreign military sales. The fountain-
head is found in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
or specifically as already mentioned, in the Office of the Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations
(DS/i/lLN). The DSa/ILN and his staff do not and cannot operate a
id.. 5 billion a year sales program solely on a Defense Department basis.
In line with constitutional principles and bureaucratic precepts, the
sales program is supported and checked by other government agencies.
Congress, of course sanctions and furthers the sales program through
its Foreign Aid, Export Control, Trade Expansion and Banking legis-
lation, appropriates funds to maintain the program and up to the present
time has authorized a management fund to help finance sales. It is
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this lost authorization that has come under attack in the fiscal year
1968 foreign aid authorization bill. This authorization in all proba-
bility will be withdrawn by June 30, 1963; If indeed this is the case,
it will greatly effect ILN's ability to negotiate arms sales to coun-
tries who in the past have relied heavily on credit sales for their
arms purchases. This management, or "revolving fund" as it is referred
to in the Pentagon, was authorized by the Congress in 1963 and provided
for a ^4.00 million fu::d which has been used for short term loans to
purchasing countries. When the loans are repaid the funds are used
again for other loan purchases. There have been no defaults to da .
,
The alternatives to this type of revolving fund are: (l) a cutback in
the sales prcgr;j;ns; or (2) increased Military Aid Appropriations en the
part of Congress to finance these loans. The first of these alternatives
will not help our balance of payments, and the second will be an extremely
difficult undertaking with a Congress not too favorably inclined toward
Aid bills. The total fiscal 1968 MAP appropriation when finally •
by the Congress will be in the vicinity of §560 million, or less than
one half of the fiscal 1965 appror-iation.
Although, in their Defense Appropriation and Foreign Assistant
hearirgs, members of Congress probe into the foreign military sales
program, they do not generally interfere with its daily conduct,
Leportront and agencies which do have almost daily contact with ILK are
State, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
National Aeronautics and Space Admin: bion (NASA), and the F.
Aviation Agency (FAA).

The Slate Department's principal responsibility in the foreign
military sales field is the centre] of exports end imports of munitit
and associated equipment and technologies. State approves arms sales
in the private field through munitions control, and in the public field
through the military assistance and military sales. Mr. Kuss meets
with his counterparts in the State Department once a week to iron out
the U. S. foreign policy position on any given sale.
The Agency for International Development (AID), which receives
policy guidance from the Secretary of State, may also have an interest
in military sales if police forces are to be equipped or if the financ-
ing of a sale involves an AID barter agreement.
The U. S. Information Agency (USIA) may also be involved to
evaluate a sensitive public information problem or to explain to its
foreign audience why the U. S. is engaged in a particular sale.
The Commerce Department which has primary cognizance over non-
military U. S. international trade also supports ILN by providing
foreign industrial information, basic marketing data and publicizing
NATO business to U. 5. industry.
The key agency responsible for the formulation and execution of
policies and programs dealing with international finances and curren-
cies is the Treasury Department. Credit arrangements with governments
which wish to buy military systems offered by ILN are worked out
frequently between ILN, Treasury and the Export-Import Bank of Washing-
ton, a government banking institution. Like the revolving fund, tl
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Export-Import loans hove come under fire from certain quarters of
Congress, notably the Banking and Currency Committee who this yet r
protested that they were not consulted on this type of arrangement.
Sometimes the barter of agricultural commodities is pert of the
financial arrangement to pay for the purchase of weapons and the
Department of Agriculture and its Commodity Credit Corporation get
involved.
The AEG, NASA, and FAA become involved in foreign defense sales
if systems or technologies under their respective jurisdiction are to
be exported. The AEC by lev; regulates and controls the dissemiration
and export of nuclear energy technology, products and materials. The
National Aeronautical and Space Administration is interested in military
sales if the national space program, its hardware and technology bee:
involved. The Federal Aviation Agency concerns itself with aviation
and air traffic control plans as these systems may be involved.
It is interesting to note that the functional responsibilities
assigned by the Assistant Secretary of Lefense/ISA to ILN state that
the development of policies, plans, and programs for foreign military
sales in countries for which substantial military assistance (grant
aid) is planned are to made in coordination with the Principal Ceputy
Assistant Secretary/ISA, and those for countries where no military
assistance is planned are coordinated with the Regional lirectcrs of
ISA. This distinction serves to provide a close coordination of sales
activities with MAP programs through the front office of ISA,
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The management structure of the micro-staff (2 !j people) for s :
has changed little in the past five years, but like the rest of ISA it
has undergone some changes in responsibility assignments, end the orig-
inal (1962) division into color (Red, White, Blue, Gray) Teams has been
replaced in the past year with divisions into Directorate assignments.
A basic feature of ILN Directorate responsibility is his dual missio:.:
a regicnal assignment, and a functional assignment for the entire ILN
staff. Since the bulk of the actual as well as the potential defense
market lies in Europe, three of the Directorates concentrate on the
continent end its countries (United Kingdom, European, and Federal
Republic of Germany). The absence of Africa from the regicnal break-
down reflects the Department of Defense's thinking—that there is no
market in sight there for years to come. ILN, out. of necessity, has
concentrated on sales of large weapons systems in the past. But now
interest is growing to reach second and third tier producers and sup-
pliers in the United States and interest them in this market. ILN, as
a government unit, concentrates on government-to-government sales.
Once in a while it deals with foreign industry when a four-way copro-
37
duction project is negotiated. The Main Battle Tank Program, the
?6
See Figure 3, P^ge 62.
37
The word "coproduction" entered the Department of Defense lexi-
con in 1963. Coproduction is a cone. whereby a U. S. designed item cf
equipment is produced in a foreign nation from parts manufactured both
in the United States and in the foreign country. This concept was adopted

































p o3 c <
•k -Hi
^.v^i




L 4 ' ^JO O H]
»H 0) O































MBT-70, signed by the ministers of Defense of the Federal he public of
Germany and the U. £. Secretary of Defense in August 1963, is a prime
example of this type of negotiation. The MBT-70 will be producible and
supportable logistically in both countries. ILN representatives meet
periodically with their German counterparts to determine along with the
U. S. and F. R. G. Project managers discussion matters that should be
addressed at the ministerial level. If the project is successful, and
from all indications it will be, other NATO Allies may well wish to
purchase the tank. There have already been indications of interest
from Belgium, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
The opportunities for dialogue and cooperation in such arrange-
ments cover a wide spectrum and are evident in a recent problem of
standards for fasteners which became a major problem early in the
design stage. After negotiation, it was agreed that the U. S. Produced
parts would use the inch standard, Germany would use the metric, and
where there was interface, or joining of parts, the metric standard
would be used. This is the first adaption of international thread
38fasteners standards.
To back up ILN in the conduct of sales negotiations the resources
of the entire Defense Department can be utilized. Within ISA the Direc-
tor of ILN receives regional information from the country desks (Regional
Directors), and cooperative programs with foreign nations are worked out
^ Armed Forces Man; m nt, Vol. 13 No. /+ (January 1967), p. 53.

uwith other Defense offices, such as the Director of Defense Research &
Engineering (DDR&E) on Cooperative R&D and Data Exchange Agreements,
and with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (installations and Dogistics)
on Cooperative Logistics Support (spares, maintenance).
In the field, ILN has the authority to us:; the resources of the
Unified Commands, the Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and the
Defense Attache system where no f.IAAG group is present in the area. As
previously pointed out, the MAAG's are the principal contacts between
ILN and foreign armed forces. Since the MAAG's are in a key position
to know the needs of foreign armed forces and are familiar with high
foreign defense officials, their contribution to the foreign military
sales effort is immense. ' There are other Defense field activities,
such an NATO liaison offices, material missions, the Defense Advisor of
the U. S. Regional Organization in Europe (USRO), which also are avail-
able to support the sales program.
Mr. Kuss and his ILN staff readily recognize that techniques for
achieving sales are constantly evolving and becc; i ;ere sophisticated.
The direct, out-right sale is becoming tougher \ the quid pro ~uo
is becoming more important. The coproduction agrt: ement is a prime
example of this kind cf technique.
Like so much of ISA, ILN is also interested in cutting red tape,
and to do this the effort has boon made to keep the organization small,





Services while ILN plays the role of coordinator. As expressed by
Mr. Kuss, "Cutting red tape and an entrepreneur-al attitude arc really
the clues to our coordinating job".
Because J.LN relies on the military departments, the Joint Staff,
Treasury and other agencies to carry the workload, they are able to
direct greater in-depth attention and monitoring to programs. Because
of their functional assignment tie-ins the regional groups are closely
knit so that when one group has a general problem it is almost invari-
ably a problem which concerns all groups.
As the newest and probably the most dynamic organisation -within
ISA today, the Office of International Logistics Negotiations is playing
a large supporting role in both the formulation and execution of national
security policy.
Spe cial Offices
The most recent rearrangement (August 1967) of responsibilities
within ISA resulted in the creation of three special functional offices
which report directly to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary.
None of these offices are new to ISA, but until this past year they were
assigned as additional responsibilities to a Regional Director. These
separations from a geographical environment is more in keeping with ti Lr
world-wide interests and also reflects a desire within ISA to unencural
/0
Armed Forces Ivl rvt, Vol. 11 No. 4 (January 1965), p. 29
•
• \ o Figure 2, p. 28.
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the duties of the Regional Directors so as to allow them to be more
responsive to their primary assignment.
The first of these special offices is the Directorate for Foreign
Military Rights. The primary responsibility of this office is to work
in conjunction with other interested offices of the Secretary of Defense,
the Military Departments, the Department of State, end other govern-
mental agencies in developing instruction for U. S. representatives in
negotiating for military facilities and operating rights abroad. This
Office also has cognisance over Status of Forces Agreements which are
maintained with all countries in which U. S. military forces ara
stationed such as Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Germany. ^ This
Office is primarily composed of personnel with extensive backgrounds in
international law.
The second of these special Offices is that of Military Assis-
tance Review whose prime function is to develop coordinated integrated
policy guidance for both the Military Assistance Programs and Military
Assistance Sales system. Guidance for the preparation of long range
Military Assistance end Military Lxport Sales plans ana programs t ~ N
that they are in consonance with U. S. military strategy and broad
objectives is also the concern of this offi.ee. In essence this is the
office that backstops the Inspector General, Foreign Assistance located
/2
In 1955 the United States had over 5C0 military bases and
installations in foreign countries—today there are fewer than .
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in the Department of State in providing a continuing appraisal of the
MAP process. It is also this Office that prepares the draft Memorandum
for the President on Military Assistance that is used in preparation of
the Budget Request to the Congress.
The last and newest (August 1967) of the special offices is t
Directorate for. Foreign Disclosure and Trade Control (FDTC). This ns
office is responsible for Defense participation in trade information
control programs including all international programs designed to lii. it
or alter the free flow of trade. Participation in export control pro-
grams including all United States programs designed to limit or diract
the flow of exports of articles of information from the United State:
3
is also a responsibility of this Office. The foreign disclosure aspects
of the Office's responsibility concerns the coordination of De posi-
tions and policy recommendations on all matters pertaining to the
disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and
international organizations. It is also the responsibility of this office
to maintain contact with representatives of foreign governments, and for-
eign and U. S* industry in connectio.. with foreign disclosure and mu:.
tions export control cases.
As can b.o concluded from a review of the detailed function:' of the
various offices within ISA, there are few, if any, international problems
or concerns that do not involve the Department of Defense, and ISA is U
focal point for most of these involvements. «

CHAPTER IV
ISA IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY PROCESS
With the growth of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
particularly the office of the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs, a focal point has been created for Department of
Defense positions on national security matters. This growth in size
and power of the international security affairs area of the Defense
establishment has resulted from awareness of the fact that defense poli-
cies are not a matter of military strategy alone, but as stated earlier
they involve the availability of resources—men, aoney and materials
—
and relationships with allies and international organizations. They,
therefore, require the coordination of many different government agen-
43
cies.
The International Security Affairs Office in the Pentagon has in
effect been placed between the two main sources for military and politi-
cal advice—Defense and State. As already pointed out, in addition to
responsibilities for military aid oo foreign nations, ISA regional
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A closer look at the specific day to day working relationships
of ISA both from within and without the Defense Department reveals the
magnitude of the role that this Office has come to play in natioi
policy formulation, but before doing this it might be well to make a
few observations about the national policy making community itself.
The policy making community probably cannot be described as a
large firm. This is perhaps due to its not having calculable control
over its desired end product, which is, hopefully, order in a world of
conflict. Furthermore, it tends to be people and issue oriented, and
not much concerned with procedures or definite goals. Professor Brcdie
has described policy making as ". . . .a multi-storied structure, and
the higher we get in it the more we tend to bo removed, from the area of
careful, dispassionate analysis."^
It appears that the policy making community is composed basically
of the Secretaries of State and Defense, and their principal Deputies,
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Jcir.t Chiefs of Staff,
especially the Chairman. In addition, key subordinates of the C binet
level include the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Chairman of
the Policy Planning Council, the Assistant Secretaries of State for
regions, the Assistant Secretary of Dofense/ISA, and the deputies end
Bernard Brodie, Sj^rate_gy In The fissile Age, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965), p* 388.
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staffs of these men. It is these key subordinates who constitute the
policy making community for day to day business.
This policy making community is distinct from two other "communi-
ties" in national security affairs which are also concerned with the
future and preparation for it. One of these could be labeled the "force
development and deployment community". Most of the lefonse Department
is concerned with this endeavor. A projection of future conflicts, how-
ever crude, is needed to establish force requirements. The projection,
however, depends more on plausibility than probability, and this is as
it must be. However, from a purely military point of view, force require-
ments planning must be based on enemy capabilities, not intentions, for
intentions can change more rapidly than capabilities. The process of
determining force requirements from scenarios does not depend very much
on timely and very detailed input from the real world, as the large part
of the world scene and its types of conflict change only very slowly.
The types of simulation employed in this type of projected scenario are
labeled "war games" which are designed to test the feasibility and
capabilities of forces.
A third community in national security affairs could be called
"command and control". Its primary preparations are in communications
hardware and organization and ultimately it is responsible for operations.
The National Military Command Center (NMCC), located in the Pentagon, is
the prime focus of this community, and its Command Post exercises are
.large-scale simulations of conceivable situations. The NMCC functions
primarily as a message center and information repository.
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The three communities interact only "very crudely in the normal
course of events, and as a result each tries to keep its requirements
rather flexible to accommodate the others. But altogether they have
different functions, different personnel, and different perspectives on
the world.
They definitely interact in time of crisis, as now in Vietnam, or
in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. But the interaction takes place at
the level of the President, and the immediate Presidential group, such
as the Executive Committee of the Cuban crisis on which the Assistant
Secretary of Defense/ISA was a key member. Here policy, forces, and
direction are joined for action.
Returning- to the policy making community itself, it tends to be
exclusive, almost a clique. It is interagency in composition, and
agency institutional views tend to be blurred by the search for concen-
sus. The community tends to co-opt members on a "good man" basis. ^-
The "good men" in turn reach out for their own "good men", ana thus the
community consists of expending circles. It is probably correct to
state that most members ere quite modest about t-neir influence, and
tend to think of themselves as ultimately staff men for the President
or for their Secretary.
45
Other populer terms used within ISA to connote this si
premise are "busy brights" and "busy dulls". They refer to th<
whose opinions are valued and sought, "brights'lj and to those whose
opinions are not sought on other than purely routine matters, "dulls".
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As for the substance of the policy making community's work, the
majority of its members are concerned in the first place with the long-
range future, the shape of the world and its yield of broad policy (as
for instance toward nuclear proliferation). The resultant policies set
perspectives, attitudes, and interests. But very little time or effort
appears to be spent by the upper level members of the community in this
area. There is an evolution, a growth, of broad policies that finds
expression in public speeches, in American politics, in the commentary
of journalists, but it is at best a fuzzy process. Policies actually
articulated are usually ex-post facto, and have little to do with the
actual choices of strategies and programs.
Following broad policy cones strategy. Here the emphasis is on
manipulation of factors not as much for a desired outcome as for the
capability of remaining engaged in world affairs. This is demonstrated
by an emphasis on deterrent strength and the signalling of that emphasis.
Strategy is closely related to force development, deployment and control,
but the policy makers have to be very careful not to outrun or assume too
great a subtlety of application of the existing capabilities.
The next step is programs of action in implementation of policies
and strategies. The policy making community is here involved chiefly in
the stopping and starting of such programs, while others administer them.
Between the longer range policies and operation in actual crises
comes contingency planning. This is sometimes referred to as "crisis
anticipation", and there is an attempt to combine available forces,
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authority and communications with the scenarios prior to policy deci-
sions. In this type of planning the community manipulates scenarios, as
in a politico-military game.
Finally, the policy making community supports decisions in
actual crises through quick preparation of alternative courses of
action and estimates of action-reaction sequences. This time-urgent
planning is the kind done by the "good men".
This look at the policy making community points up one very signi-
ficant reality and that it that the world is complex, its problems
multifarious and pressing. As a consequence the policy making community
feels an almost continual sense cf crisis (life is just one thing after
another). Little time is left for detailed long-range planning or
methodical applications. It is thus difficult to compel the attention
of the most influential of policy makers on other than the pressing
problems of the moment. This fact was clearly evident during the Cutan
missile crisis. Up until the tirre that agreement was given by the
Soviets to withdraw the missiles and medium range bombers from Cuba, the
top po!Hcy makers were in almost continuous session. Following these
agreements it was i-mpossible to gather the group together for lessor
decisions such as inspections. The crisis had passed and the problems
of Cuba were no longer pressing.
It is also difficult to discover the "world outlook" of the impor-
tant policy makers. It can probably be said that they have an essentially
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pragmatic view of the world, and would probably lean to a chaotic inter-
pretation of it. They are also inclined to look for quick solutions to
current problems. °
Functioning .of „ISA
With this as a background let us now return to the Office of ISA
itself. ISA is basically a non-institutionalised organization which
enjoys and readily uses its perogatives to cut across traditional and
service lines in search of answers and solutions to current problems.
It has been, es a result, both responsive and quick in furnishing the
Secretary of Defense with trie necessary information and analysis to
support him in his capacity as a statuatory member of the National
Security Council. These perogatives on occasion have been critized by
some as having the effect of by-passing older and more traditionally
structured organizations such as the individual military services as
well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This, the critics point out, is not
to say that a "military opinion T ' is absent from the decisions or posi-
tions arrived at by ISA. Such opinions are invariably supplied by the
project officers (both military and civilian) assigned to ISA who have
authority to deal directly with an individual service action officer,
Joint Staff officer, or even a Unified or Specified Command in order to
+ These thoughts concerning the policy maker and the community in
which he operates are based on nurerous discuL-saons with ISA, JCS, end
State Department Planning staff members and former merabersi and the
personal observations of the writer over the past two years from within




obtain the information required for the position being formulated.
However, the ingredient that seme critics fear is overlooked in this
approach is the acquiring of a Joint Staff "military position" which may
or may not be the same as a "military opinion" en any given issue.
Although it may surprise the traditionally bound, this procedure it can
be argued, is not much different from the informal relationships that
are employed in the practical functioning of most organizations. Of
course one can point to many dangers in such a procedure, such as the
risk of overlooking some important aspect of the problem by relying on
one or possibly two "opinions" instead of a well considered 'position"
or consensus of many. The expertise end personality of the individual
introducing the "opinion" and not the position he may occupy, has
become the creditable point in this argument. In ISA today this is
the reality. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA, Mr. Paul C.
Warnke, and his deputies are men who enjoy reputations as men of valued
expertise. These men and their assistants are today exercising a great
deal cf influence in national security policy formulation.
This procedure of utilizing men for what they can do rather than
because of the titles they may bear is net a new approach in Defense
organization. James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, it is
said, liked to insist that he was not as much interested in the diagr
of organization as he was in the names in the little boxes. This vie
is a common and important one. Organizations are made uo of men: there
is no substitute for their quality. Formal organization was, in the
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mind of Mr. Forrestal, not all important, but in large scale organi-
ze
zations, he realized, it is an unavoidable starting point of inquiry. '
This same theme prevails in the minds of other government leaders such
as the Secretary of State Who recently said, "No organizational chart-
can substitute for the abilities end attitudes of people."^
To develop this thesis of a few enjoying considerable influence
a step further, it is necessary to mention the veto influence that the
planners and desk officers in ISA are in a position to exercise over
positions submitted by the Joint Staff concerning military matters.
To do this, let us consider a hypothetical but nevertheless
typical problem situation. A situation is developing in country X
which can affect U. S. interests on a v/ide range of issues—economic,
military, as well as political. The related cables sent by the on
scene Ambassador are distributed simultaneously to the State Department,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ISA. The regional desk officer in ISA
gets in touch immediately with the corresponding desk officer in State
either in person or by telephone. The method of contact depends on the
classification or sensitivity of the matter to be discussed. After this
contact and en initial exchange of information, the ISA officer
commences to develop "Defense's" position based on the best available
in
* Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961 ), p. 179.
/,8 i
Message from Secretary Rusk to his celiegues in the Depertn
of State and Abroad, March 4, 1966.
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information. This information may be contained in existing contingency
plans, or as mentioned above, obtained by direct liaison with the indi\
ual service action officers, or by direct contact with various members of
the Joint Staff. If some of the information sought is only available
from a Unified Commander in the field (e.g. CINCPAC, CINCLANT) direct
inquiry is made. If necessary, the ISA officer may likewise contact any
other agency or department in the government for information*
In the meantime, the Joint Staff has also received the same cable.
But the Joint Staff Officer taking action on the matter does not enjoy
the benefit of direct and informal relationships with agencies and
departments other than the Unified Commands. He is restricted by the
functional and structured lines of communication that ere inherent in
the military chain of command. As hard as he may try, it is net possible
under the existing procedural restrictions to pre, pare a Joint Staff posi-
tion that is a concensus of all three services in the time frame that the
task is being accomplished by the ISA officer operating under a completely
flexible modus operandi. Not only dees the internal discipline and tradi-
tional institutions of each service hinder the Joint Staff officer, but
the difficulties in obtaining an agreed position among the services is
also a source of deloy, and in some' instances produces less than a
creditable result. As a consequence, the position that finally is for-
warded by the Joint Staff to the Secretary of Defense (it goes via I!
on all politico-military matters) may be late in arriving, or may hav
little validity when it dee.; arrive because of the concessions which i
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have been made to obtain a concensus. As a further consequence, the
position rendered by the Joint Staff may not be in agreement with the
position arrived at by the ISA officer. It is now vulnerable to being
changed or overruled. Here again, expertise and personality enter the
arena of decision. Should the ISA officer wish to challenge the Joint
Staff position he c^'n make his disagreements known to his immediate
superior who in the majority of situations is one of ISA's seven Deputy
Assistant Secretaries. He may, also, to support his disagreement, go
back to the individual service action officers (Army, Navy or Air Force)
who worked on the JCS position to get their separate thoughts on the
issue itself and to determine those items which may have been elimi-
nated or modified in order to produce an agreed service position.
Should he discover that there was a split vote on the position in the
first place, or that in obtaining the concensus a significant compromise
was made, his argument for challenge is further substantiated. All this,
of course, tends to weaken the Joint Staff position and strengthen the
arguments of the ISA officer when he presents his challenge to his
superior. It is not uncommon in these instances for the Joint Staff
position to be overruled in favor of that of the ISA acticn officer.
The present members of the JCS have recognized the degree to which con-
census seeking can inhibit the military input to national security
matters and have recently advised their acticn officers that although
there is a strong desire for agreement, particularly at the action
officer level, there is a preference to present dissenting opinioi
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rather than compromising a paper into an inferior propose!. Dissenting
opinions, although preferred, still give the ISA action officer the S
opportunity to push for his "position" vis-a-vis a Joint Staff position
in which there is disagreement.
Although it is possible for Joint Staff positions to be overruled
by ISA, it must be pointed out that the issues on which this occurs are
not usually of a substance that would classify them as primary issues.
Such primary issues are dealt with by the individual statuatory members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves and their decisions on such
issues are sent directly to the Secretary of Defense and are, thus, not
directly subject to a veto by ISA. However, ISA may still be asked by
the Secretary of Defense to review and comment en these JCS positions.
This poinc notwithstanding, the fact still remains that those
issues which are subject to being overruled by ISA, although net primary
in nature are issues which can, and oftentimes do, become a part of
overall national security policy.

CHAPTER Y
The Office of Internationa]. Security Affairs has thus evolved
from a simple military assistance institution to a policico—military
bureau. This hrj>s come about because of a transformation of power that
has been in process since World War II from a simple politico-military
form of JCS—President (and advisers) to the more complex forms of a
new elite of State-White House-Defense. But, the growth of ISA has
occurred primarily because the role of the Defense Establishment in the
area of international security affairs has grown with the realization
that defense policies involve not merely raatters of strategy, but also
involve relations with allies and international organizations, and arc
influenced by the availability of resources. The close coordination
with other agencies of government which these require is the basic
concern of ISA whose charter also designates the Assistant Secretary of
Defense/ISA as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense
in the functional field of international security. In this capacity the
Assistant Secretary is authorized to coordinate not only with the Depart-
ment of State, but with the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and other Department of Defense agencies having collateral or
related functions in this field, and to make full use of the established
facilities within the Defense Establishment. This authority is central
to the effective functioning of ISA.
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In treeing the origins and the varied and complex involveraej
of ISA in national security policy formulation, this inquiry has endeav-
ored to point out the flexible and changing structure of the organiza-
tion itself.
It probably can be said that reorganization is good from time to
time for it realigns formal relationships and trims off ancillary infor-
mal off-shoots that tend to sap the viable operative apparatus of an
organization. We must assume, of course, that most organizations have,
and need, informal relationships. But even these require control and
occasional review to permit orderliness to obtain. There is also reward
in reorganizing formal organization to eliminate such things as "layer-
ing", "inverse pyramid", and "middle management squeeze-out". Each of
these conditions are found in organizations v;here active top management
is responsive to strong personality leadership or vast diverse work-
loads much of which is dollar-oriented or political effective.
This, it would seem, is what ISA has been doing since its estab-
lishment, but the process is not, nor will it ever be, complete. The
self analysis will most likely continue in older to determine:
1. Is ISA required?
2. If so, is it fulfilling its mission? and,
3. If not, how can it do the job tetter?
Historically, the answer to the first question is probably nyes r'.
ISA developed because a need for coordination between the I . rtments
of State and Defense existed to deal with the now and co triplicated

62
politico-military involvements of the post World War II period* There
does not appear to be any lessening of this requirement in the foi .
able future.
The second question, is it doing its mission, is more difficult
to answer because ISA appears to be carrying out three tasks at the
same time, while manifestations of a new, not clearly definable mission,
seems to be on the horizon. The three tasks that can be identified are:
(l) accounting for, disbursing, and manipulating MAP accounts including
military assistance sales; (2) justifying or denying JCS military (and
sometimes non-military) thoughts, hopes and reactions; and (3) bolster-
ing and balancing plans or operations of ether organizations and agen-
cies—AID, State, Commerce, NASA, etc. Jobs (2) and (3) lend themselves
to creating demands for new tasks, namely research, and planning of
foreign policy wherein military considerations are a lesser function
of the whole.
ISA is intended to function as "the bridge" between the Depart-
ments of Defense and State, but in so doing there is the possibility of
ISA becoming a +-hird force and the relationship becoming one of compet-
itor rather than broker. There is today within both Departments some
feeling that this is the case. In order to thwart this trend, there arc
recent instances of informal relationships and direct coordination
between the action officers of the Joint Staff and the Count
.
sk
Officers of State which by-pass "the bridge" and provide, what is con-
sidered by these who use the by-pass, a more significant military input
into Stt:t. and vice versa.

83
This leads to the third and perhaps more difficult question, how
ce.n it do the job better? No doubt there are things that it can do
better for certainly the frequent reorganizations and redistributions
of functions that seem to go on continuously within ISA (there have been
three substantial realignments within the organization in the past two
years) would indicate on effort to do this* There also seems to be
some basis to the criticism that ISA has too many bosses and too f
"indians". This malady is an inevitable consequence of a small organi-
zation of highly educated and talented people each seeking his place in
the sun. There has been over the years a steady increase in the num-
bers in the top management of ISA without a corresponding improvement
in the numbers of the staff who are doing the detail work, and who
should spend much more time than they now have available on research
and analysis.
ISA is, like much of the policy making community, a crisis manage-
ment environment and there is a constant requirement for "now" answers*
This may indicate a lack of defined objectives and a tendency to be only
reactive rather than capable of progressive and positive initiatives.
This is a criticism that could be directed at all the policy makii
community, and is one which is easier recognized than remedied.
In .spite of internal problems which exist in ISA, and certainly
problems exist in any organization, especially if it is dynamic, ISA




Timothy W. Stanley, in his book American Defense and Nat
Security , writes:
Formulation of national security policies can be likened to a
triangle with the President at the apex, the Secretary of State
at one angle, end the Secretary of Defense at the other. The
National Security Council might well occupy the center.
The two Secretaries, however, are themselves the peaks of their own vast
organizational pyramids. Each and e^ch alone is charged with the pr--
responsibility for his &rea. It is the office and person of the Secre-
tary rather than the Department itself which is assigned responsibilities
and must give advice to the President. Although he cannot dodge the
ultimate responsibility, the Secretary much delegate 'some of it. In the
area of International Security Affairs it is the powers and duties of t
Secretary of Defense which have been delegated to an Assistant Secretary
of Defense and his Staff. In his own right the Assistant Secretary for
ISA, of the twelve Assistant Secretaries in the Defense establishment,
is the only one who is a designated member of the corporate body known
as the Joint Secretaries— comprising the two top civilian officials of
the Office of the Secretary of Defease and the Secretary of. each mili-
tary department. ^' He also attends the twice weekly policy meetings
with the State Department, and enjoys close working relationships with
numerous other agencies, including Arms Control and Disari nt and the
Director of the National Security Council. Just as the State Depe
* U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machj
ery> Orffanizj rial Security: Studi
(Washington: Go1 ; Office, 191
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represents the United States as a whole in international natters, so
ISA officially represents the Pentagon in dealing with other agencies
—
60
and with other countries.
Dr. Stanley aptly sums up the role of ISA when he v/rites, "Of
all the units under the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is the most
53directly related to the overall organization for national security".
The assigned responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense/ISA which direct him to maintain close coordination v/ith other
agencies reflect in large measure the findings of the Senate Subcc -
miotee on National Policy Machinery that a close partnership must obtain
at all levels betv.een the Departments of State and Defense particularly
52
at the echelons where the critical initial work of planning "cakes place.
As a result, a great deal of influence has been focused in the Assistant
Secretary of Defense which is readily transmitted through the Secretary
of Defense to the National Security Council. With current, reliable
and meaningful information to assist him in formulating his recom:
tions to the President, the Secretary of Defense can and does make a
considerable contribution to the formulation of national security




Timothy Vs. Stanley, American Defe • '
(Y/ashington: Public Affairs I . 1956), p. // .
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